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November 2019
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Speeches

Y.S. Kim: Address to World Summit

Address to World Summit 2019, Seoul, Korea, February 7–11, 2019
Discussions on Establishing a Peace Regime and the Future of the Korea - U.S. Alliance
Yeol-Soo Kim
Director of the Security Strategy Division, Korea Institute for Military Affairs

 

  1. Introduction

○ Second North Korea - U.S. Summit

- Steps are quickly being taken in preparation for the second North Korea - U.S. Summit. Kim Yong-Chol visited the White House and hand-delivered a letter from Kim Jong-Un to President Donald Trump during a 90-minute meeting.

- Stephen Biegun, United States Special Representative to North Korea, says that the three-day meeting with North Korean diplomat Choi Sun-Hee and Republic of Korea negotiator Do-Hoon Lee in Stockholm was “constructive.”

- As denuclearization moves forward, the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will become the primary topic of discussion.

Comments made by high-ranking leaders on the prospect of denuclearization

- In the Pyongyang Joint Declaration signed on September 19, 2018, the North expressed its “willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, as the United States takes corresponding measures.”

- Vice President Mike Pence, who attended the East Asia Summit in November 2018, emphasized that the second summit will need to include discussions focusing on a clear roadmap to denuclearization, rather than merely a report on North Korea’s nuclear program’s current status.

- At the New Year’s Press Conference on January 10, President Moon Jae-In suggested that “North Korea could demolish its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the production line that produces these missiles, or other nuclear complexes. Then when the U.S. implements corresponding measures, trust will be built and it will be possible for the denuclearization process to continue smoothly.”

- During an interview with Fox News on January 11, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo emphasized the importance of demolishing the ICBMs, stating, “At the end, the objective is the security of the American people.”

- During his 2019 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-Un stated, “We will neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer, nor use and proliferate them.”

* To summarize, the U.S. is not asking North Korea to submit a report of their nuclear weapons right away. Instead, the intermediate objective is the dismantlement of the Yeongbyeon nuclear facilities, as well as the demolishment of the ICMBs. North Korea is saying that they will demolish all current and future nuclear weapons, while warning the U.S. not to touch their older nuclear weapons. Ultimately, won’t the second North Korea - U.S. Summit consist of an exchange of corresponding measures (liaison office, end-of-war declaration, partial sanctions relief, etc.) for a nuclear freeze?

* This scenario has already been outlined in the U.S. State Department’s East Asia-Pacific Region Joint Strategic Report (November 20, 2018). The report explains that although the ultimate goal is “final and fully verifiable denuclearization (FFVD),” the short-term focus is to have North Korea take concrete steps toward denuclearization, including halting their nuclear missile tests, production of nuclear weapons, etc.

* If this takes place, the process of denuclearization would completely change from “report, verify, demolish” to “freeze, reduce, demolish.” Will it be possible to have discussions on a peace regime during the freeze? Will the reduction and demolishment of nuclear weapons be realized down the road?

  1. Ceasefire Regime and Peace Regime

A Summary and Brief History of Peace Regimes

Denuclearization and a Peace Regime

- During his New Year’s address, Kim Jong-Un emphasized that “in order to transform the current ceasefire regime to a peace regime, multilateral negotiations should be pursued as a means to secure the foundation for permanent peace.”

- Nevertheless, the denuclearization talks and peace regime talks supported by China are not simply two simultaneous discussions advancing parallel to each other. Once denuclearization has progressed to a certain point, the possibility of holding discussions of a peace regime will be greater.

- Together with discussions of a peace regime, discussions of the Korea - U.S. Alliance, the United Nations, and the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea may be possible.

A Ceasefire Regime and Peace Regime

▲ A regime is composed of the function (objective) of the regime, the units that constitute the regime, and a standard to regulate the interaction between the units in order to fulfill the function (objective).

▲ A ceasefire regime is generally established by military commanders, and its function (objective) is to bring a war to a temporary standstill. In other words, its objective is to passively maintain peace by calling for an armistice. The units that comprise this ceasefire regime are North and South Korea, China, and the United Nations (U.S.A.). The signatories included the North Korean Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, and the Commander of the United Nations Command. However, the parties involved in the agreement were North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. The ceasefire agreement serves as the standard by which the relevant parties interact.

▲ Peace regimes are generally established by heads of state or national representatives, and its function (objective) is to restore peace and actively promote relations between the involved parties. The units that would comprise this peace regime are the international community, including North and South Korea, the U.S., and China. The peace treaty would serve as the standard by which the relevant parties would interact.

Measures Taken by North Korea to Neutralize the Ceasefire Regime

▲ Withdrawal from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)

- North Korea was strongly opposed to the United Nations Command’s appointment of a general in the Korean army as a senior member of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (March 1991) and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (March 1993). North Korea began a full-fledged effort to nullify the ceasefire regime and endorse a peace treaty/provisional treaty with the U.S.

- Following North Korea’s withdrawal of its representatives from the Military Armistice Commission (April 1993), it expelled Czech members of the NNSC from its territory (April 1993). The Panmunjeom division of the North Korean People’s Army, which replaced the Military Armistice Commission, was established in Kaesong (May 1994). China withdrew from the UNCMAC (December 1994). Following North Korea’s expulsion of the Polish delegation of the NNSC from its territory (February 1995), it announced that it would no longer recognize the Demilitarized Zone (April 1996) and carried out an armed protest against the Joint Security Area. From June 1998, North Korea began to conduct general-level talks between the United Nations Command and the Korean People’s Army.

▲ Proposal of a Provisional Agreement Prior to a Peace Treaty (announced by the Department of Foreign Affairs in June 1996)

- Because the ceasefire agreement was nullified in North Korea, interim measures, such as the management of the Military Demarcation Line and the demilitarized zone, solutions for armed and incidental conflicts, structure and assignments plus authority rights of military joint organizations, protocol amendments and supplements, should be part of a provisional agreement with the United States in order to establish a guaranteed peace system.

Disapproval and reasons for refuting the parties directly concerned with the Peace Treaty

▲ North Korea’s argument

- The United States took part in the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement and the U.S. troops have wartime operational control over the Korean Army. Therefore, South Korea cannot be considered as a party directly involved with the Peace Treaty.

- During the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1992, a non-aggression treaty was agreed to, so the establishment of a separate peace treaty is unnecessary.

▲ South Korea’s argument

- It is North Korea’s misinterpretation that South Korea is “not a party directly involved” because the Commander-In-Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC) was representing the whole when the ceasefire agreement was signed.

- And strictly speaking, due to the UN mandate, the United Nations Forces Commander is only a representative, and not a representative of the United States, and Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, is also not considered as a representative of China’s government

- It can also be said that there is a distinction between the signatories and the parties involved who will be directly restricted due to the agreement and treaties. It is evident that South Korea will be restricted due to the treaty, and as a party directly involved, South Korea has attended political conferences in the past.

- There is a clause in Article 4, paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement that states “3 months within effectuation, each country should dispatch representatives and convene in the high-level political conference... withdrawal of foreign military and discussion for a peaceful solution to the Korean problems, etc.” In accordance with this, on April 26, 1954, Korea attended the political conference held in Geneva as a party that was directly involved. When the UN took part in the war, 16 countries (excluding South Africa) and South Korea, North Korea, Soviet Union, and China participated. Our representative was Byeon Yeong Tae and North Korea’s representative was Nam Il. While South Korea suggested the implementation of a free election while under the surveillance of the UN, the Communist side suggested the withdrawal of foreign troops. In conclusion, negotiations fell apart on June 15. Through this conference, South Korea has already received recognition as a party that is directly involved.

▲ During the four-way conference between South Korea, North Korea, United States, and China (Dec. 1997~Aug. 1999 Six Summits) a peace regime for the Korean peninsula and the easing of political tension was discussed, but negotiations of the four-way conference failed because of North Korea’s demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, as well as a peace treaty between North Korea and the United States. Again, South Korea attended as a party directly involved with the peace treaty.

Case where North Korea acknowledged South Korea as a party involved in the Peace Treaty

▲ Inter-Korean Basic Agreement

- In the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, Article 5 Chapter 1, it states clearly that “the current state of the ceasefire is in order to change the relationship between North and South Korea into a state of stable peace through mutual effort. Until then, the military armistice will abide by it.” The same thing is stated in Article 5, Chapter 19 (Article 1, Annex written agreement for the fulfillment of reconciliation between North and South).

▲Six-Party Talks

- In the 2.13 treaty (2007) it states, “Parties that are directly involved will hold further negotiations at an appropriate time in a separate forum about the permanent peace regime of the Korean peninsula.”

▲ 10.4 Declaration (2008 Inter-Korean Summit)

- “North and South will cooperate, as they are both aware that the current ceasefire agreement must come to an end, and that it is necessary to construct a permanent peace regime… by holding three- or four-way summits on the peninsula in order to bring forward the problem of proclaiming the end of war.”

▲ 4.27 Panmunjeom Declaration (2018 Inter-Korean Summit)

- “North and South should... amend the ceasefire agreement into a peace treaty and construct a permanent and everlasting peace regime by holding a three-way North Korea, South Korea, and United States Summit or a four-way summit including China.”

Strategies and peace treaties of each country for the Peace Regime

Problems that may occur after the denuclearization and the Peace Regime of the Korean peninsula

▲ North Korea

- Joint statements that were announced through the 6.12 North Korea and United States Summit include improvement of the relationship between North Korea and the United States, the Peace Regime of the Korean Peninsula, and lastly, denuclearization, respectively.

- Also based on Kim Jong-Un’s New Year’s Address, it is predicted that in order to change into a peace regime through active multilateral negotiations, they will demand that a denuclearization conference be held in conjunction with a peace regime conference.

▲ China

- China continuously claimed that both sides should denuclearize, and that North Korea should both denuclearize and participate in the negotiations for peace. An early conference for denuclearization and a peace regime can be reasonably anticipated from them.

- If that’s the case, China can solve its own “Korea Passing” problems and expect to exercise their own share in the peninsula.

▲ United States/South Korea

- Both hope for the progression of the denuclearization to a certain extent before negotiations of a Peace Regime can be settled. Discussions of a Peace Regime will depend on the advancements on denuclearization.

- After the 3rd Inter-Korean Summit takes place, President Moon will first make a political declaration that “The War will come to an end” at a press conference. The peace negotiations can be considered as a starting point for a Peace Treaty, and when North Korea finally denuclearizes, they can ratify a Peace Treaty and thus normalize their relations with the U.S....” He said that this is the concept of declaring the end of the War that people talk about.

Strategy and goal for the Peace Treaty to be finalized

▲ North Korea

- If we analyze North Korea’s strategy and goal after the war up until now, the Peace Treaty between North and South (55~74) → Peace Treaty between the U.S. (74~83) → Peace Treaty between the U.S. and Distinction of the Non-aggression Declaration between North and South (84~06) → South Korea, North Korea, and U.S./China Peace Treaty (07~) can be claimed.

- It can be expected that North Korea will use the Peace Treaty to make a demand for the dissolution of the UN, and the alliance between South Korea and the United States, as well as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

▲ South Korea

- The commencement of negotiations will occur after major advancements of denuclearization. It can be reasoned that the time for it to take effect will come after the complete denuclearization, and when options for the peace treaties include parties directly involved in drafting the contract, or rather North and South Korea, U.S., and China, or the four countries and others drafting the contract.

- It is also possible for North and South Korea to formulate a contract directly, while the U.S. and North Korea guarantee a 2+2, or to entertain the possibility of North and South Korea making a direct contract and countries who fought in the Korean War participating in a 2+a.

- South Korea also bears in mind the historical case where Germany remained in NATO after their reunification, and is seeking a route by which to claim an Alliance between South Korea and the U.S., while ascertaining that their military has nothing to do with the Peace Treaty; and that rather than dissolving the UN, we should entertain the possibility of the UN taking on the role and function of a management entity for the Peace Treaty.

Information Included in the Peace Treaty

- Closure of the War, acknowledgement and respect for the special relationship between North and South Korea, Ground/Sea/Air boundary line, utilization of the Peace Zone in the DMZ, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, non-aggression and guaranteed security, arms control, Peace Treaty management organization, development of both parties, development of South Korea/China and North Korea/U.S. relations, amendments of the treaties and treaties taking effect.

  1. Ceasefire, Peace Regime, and the UN Command (UNC)

Establishment of the UNC and its Legal Position

UN Security Council’s Collective Security Measure

- Three resolutions, including S/1501(6.25), S/1511(6.27), S/1588 (7.7), were passed as soon as the Korean War broke out. A unified command led by the U.S. was established, and the concurrent use of the UN flag with the flags of the participating UNC nations was authorized according to S/1588.

- On July 24, 1950, the UNC led by the U.S. was established in Tokyo on the foundation of the Far East Command, and the UNC moved to Yongsan on July 1, 1957.

The Legal Position of the UNC

▲ A perspective that the UNC is a subsidiary organ of the UN

- A perspective that the dissolution of the UNC cannot be decided arbitrarily by any one of the participating UNC nations, but must undergo the resolution procedure of the UN Security Council in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 7, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

▲ A perspective that the UNC is not a subsidiary organ of the UN

- Unlike the PKO, the UNC has not used the UN budget, and has not been recorded in the UN statistical yearbook as one of the UN subsidiary organs since 1950. Neither is it related to the UN from the aspect of political and military control.

In May, 1994, the DPRK formally asked the UN Secretary-General to initiate steps that would lead to the replacement of the Armistice Agreement, as well as the termination of the UNC. To this, the UN Secretary-General replied categorically that the “U.S. alone has the authority to decide on the continued existence or the dissolution of the UNC.”

- The ROK and the U.S. have judged that the dissolution of the UNC is a matter subject to the purview of the U.S. government, whom the UN Security Council has given the authority to appoint and oversee the UN Forces commander.

The Future of the UNC after the Conclusion of the Peace Regime

The Function and Role of the UNC

- The UNC bears the function of observing and maintaining the peace regime. However, the Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice by the 16 UNC participating nations is a determination to immediately act against the recurrence of armed attacks within the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the UNC maintains military control over the participating nations, as well as the framework for support and acceptance, in case the Korean War breaks out again. Furthermore, it can provide military strength to the Korean peninsula during emergencies by utilizing the UNC rear headquarters in Japan, and other strategic points.

- A conclusion of the UNC-Japan Status Force Agreement (SOFA) (December 19, 1954): “Japan shall be allowed to provide and promote domestic and international support to military forces operating under UNC.” There are seven UNC rear headquarters in Japan.

- By the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), the mission of Korea defense has shifted from the UNC to the CFC. Currently, the UNC is executing its function to observe and maintain the peace regime.

A conclusion of the Peace Regime and the UNC

▲ UNC Dissolution Theory

- This is a theory that the purposes of S/1511 are “deterrence of North Korea’s reckless actions within ROK territory, and the restoration of international peace and security.” Since the UNC has fulfilled its mission on the conclusion of the peace regime, it must be dissolved.

▲ U.S. Determination Theory

- A perspective that since the UNC has been established as a U.S.-led command based in principle upon the Security Council resolution, and the U.S. has the authority to appoint its commander, its dissolution must also be determined by the U.S.

- The UN Secretary General’s response to DPRK in 1994 should be respected.

▲ The Shift of Function Theory

- Reorganize the UNC by shifting its function to the supervision of peace regime implementation, or implementation of new peacekeeping operation, etc.

  1. ROK-U.S. Alliance and the U.S. Forces in Korea

The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement and the ROK-U.S. Alliance

Process of Conclusion

- Progress of truce talks. President Syngman Rhee demanded conclusion of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement prior to the Communist Chinese Army’s evacuation. General Choe Deok-sin withdrew from the truce talk delegation, due to the U.S. attempt to reach a truce agreement without consulting with the ROK (May 25). Development of a movement opposing ceasefire. Release of anti-Communist prisoners of war (June 18).

- This progress was followed by the disclosure of the Eisenhower Mutual Defense Agreement following the ceasefire (July 9). The U.S. government adopted NSC 154/1 (July 13) and sent a presidential envoy to the ROK to meet with President Rhee under the policy to formulate a treaty similar to those undertaken by the U.S. in accordance to its existing treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

- Signing and effectuation of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement (53.10.1/54.11.18)

The Perception of North Korea on the Withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea.

Change of perception by periods

Constant perceptions until the 1990s

-Withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea

Intermittent acceptance remarks of U.S. Armed Forces.

- The acceptance remarks of U.S. Armed Force had occurred intermittently; however, the first remarks were made in January 1992, by Yong-Soon Kim, the International Secretary of the Workers’ Party, to Kantar, and the United States Secretary of State on his visit to the United States.

- Since then, President Kim Dae-Jung remarked that recently the North has acknowledged the presence of U.S. Armed Forces (April 7, 1999) and wished for its continued presence as a peace force, while Kim Jong-Il made similar remarks during the June 15 summit talks. Also, in 2000, Jo Myong-Rok made similarly accepting remarks regarding U.S. Armed Forces in Korea before President Clinton and Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State.

- Former Unification Minister Lim Dong-Won also claimed that North Korea demanded a change of role and position, not withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea (March 2007).

▲ Recent remarks

- The five terms (conditions) of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula announced in July, 2016, by a statement from a North Korean government spokesman, include the disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, the elimination and verification of nuclear weapons and bases in the South, the unfolding of security measures in the event of a nuclear strike on the Korean peninsula, North Korea’s nuclear non-proliferation commitment, the withdrawal of U.S. troops holding nuclear usage rights in South Korea, etc.

- At the press conference following the third North-South Korean Summit, President Moon said, “Kim Jong-Un acknowledges that this denuclearization issue, and in particular, the declaration of the end of the war, has nothing to do with this predicament or the position of the U.S. Forces in Korea.”

Korea’s Recognition of Maintenance of U.S. Forces

The United Nation Forces (UNF) and United States Forces in Korea (USFK)

- The UN Forces were dispatched under S/1588, but the U.S. Forces were stationed under Article 4 of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Therefore, U.S. Forces and UN Forces are legally separate entities.

A press conference after the third Inter-Korean Summit of President Moon (September 16, 2018)

- “The condition of the USFK is based on the alliance of ROK-U.S., so it is entirely decided between the Republic of Korea and the U.S., regardless of declaration of a war or peace agreement.”

- “Kim Jong-Un acknowledges that this denuclearization issue, especially the declaration of the end of the war, has nothing to do with this issue, nor any position of the U.S. Forces in Korea.”

FOX Interview with President Moon (September 25, 2018)

- “Until the peace agreement is concluded, the ceasefire agreement must be maintained, and even if a peace treaty is ratified, the USFK is entirely settled by the ROK-U.S. alliance, so it does not have anything to do with a peace treaty.”

- “The U.S. Forces in Korea play a big role as a deterrent to the North, but it also plays a role of a balancer to create stability and peace throughout all of Northeast Asia, and the U.S. Forces in Korea helps not only Korea’s security, but also keeps in touch with U.S. global strategy as well.”

- “Even after the peace treaty has been signed, or the reunification of North and South Korea has been realized, it is still necessary for the U.S. Forces, Korea to remain stationed for overall stability and peace throughout Northeast Asia.”

President Moon’s New Year Press Conference (January 10, 2019)

- “The U.S. Forces, Korea is not a problem that is interlocked with the process of denuclearization. Moreover, as a sovereign state, the U.S. Forces are stationed in Korea by the alliance between Korea and the United States. Consequently, wherever the end of war will be declared between the two Koreas, or between the U.S. and North Korea, or if a peace treaty will be signed, it is up to both countries whether or not to keep the U.S. Forces, Korea stationed, and Kim Jong-Un of North Korea is well aware of this fact.”

Recognition by Trump of the Alliance and United States Forces, Korea

President Trump’s Recognition of the Alliance

- President Donald Trump thinks that the United States has dispatched many troops for the alliance, and has allocated a lot in national defense expenditures, so the alliances have become rich and their borders have become safe. On the contrary, the U.S. border has become rather less stable and the military power of the U.S. has been depleted. President Trump does not treat the alliance as having value and as a security measure, but rather treats it from an economic or trading point of view.

- At the time of his candidacy, President Trump suggested that Korea pay not 50% of its present defense share, but 100%. “South Korea is a money-sucking machine, and the cost of our stay is ‘peanuts,’” he said, saying that Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany and Korea should renegotiate their defense agreements. “Even if South Korea stands against North Korea with that ‘maniac,’ it will have to defend itself on its own if it does not respect or treat us properly.”

President Trump’s Perception and Behavior Regarding Military Force Projection

▲ Recognition

- The Trump Administration favored selective intervention through a clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests.

- Emphasis was placed on a principled realism that reasons that the world is not a community, but rather a place to compete and struggle for profit; a strategy principle to minimize intervention.

- On December 26, 2018, President Trump traveled to Iraq’s al-Assad Air Force Base in Baghdad and mentioned that “America cannot remain continuously as a police for the world.” “We are not suckers of the world.”

▲ Remarks on Syrian / Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal

- In April, 2017, when the Syrian government forces dropped sarin gas in the northern part of Syria, the U.S. launched 59 Tomahawk missiles into the Syrian Air Force Base.

- In April 2018, the Syrian government forces once again attacked East Guta, a rebel stronghold near Damascus, with chemical weapons. The United States, along with Britain and France, conducted three air strikes, deploying 105 missiles into Syrian chemical weapon facilities and command facilities.

- On December 19, 2018, James Mattis, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, announced his resignation when President Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops (about 2,000 troops) in Syria, unilaterally.

- On January 21-24, 2019, Doha, Qatar, negotiations between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan brought the possibility of withdrawing more than 14,000 troops in the first half of 2019.

▲ Trump’s remarks on NATO withdrawal

- In July 2018, at the NATO summit, which included 29 nations, President Trump strongly advocated for the expansion of defense funding shares, pointing out free security coverage of allies and the withdrawal of NATO.

- “We cannot be a fool for others,” he said, adding that member states should increase defense spending to 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2024.

▲ Trump’s Remarks on the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea

- “In July 2017, when I heard some harsh stories that the United States will pay one billion dollars for the deployment of THAAD, ‘I do not know why I have to spend $3.5 billion and [keep] 28,500 people stationed. Let’s bring them back home.’” (Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House, 2018) and “The U.S. forces’ presence is to prevent the Third World War,” said Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, who resigned.

* In fact, Bob Woodward’s Fear contains breathtaking and tense content surrounding negotiations between President Trump and staff members, where Trump advocates for disposal rather than revision of the FTA, and THAAD deployment cost burden by Korea, as well as the withdrawal of the families of U.S. Forces in Korea.

- At the press conference immediately after the 6.12 Summit, he said, “I want to withdraw U.S. forces in Korea, but not now. I hope someday it happens.”

- The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act requires President Trump to get the consent of the National Assembly in order to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Korea to less than 22,000.

- John Kelly, the Secretary of Homeland Security, tried to persuade President Trump not to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea, and advised him not to withdraw the U.S. from NATO.

- Bruce Klinger, a senior researcher at the U.S. Heritage Foundation, said: “President Trump may threaten the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea in order to comply with his negotiating tactic or his presidential election pledge, where he promised to make Korea pay for all stationed U.S. Forces.”

* James Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, claimed in his farewell letter to “show more concern about the alliance.”

  1. Conclusion

A lesson on past history that has been plundered and a matter of perception for future development

- A peace treaty must be concluded after the denuclearization, and even if a peace treaty is signed, the ROK-U.S. Alliance and U.S. Forces in Korea should have no fundamental changes.

- In the case of Germany, it was reunified with the presence of U.S. troops in West Germany. Since German reunification, Europe established the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, EU), for the purpose of security and the economy.

○ UNC needs to focus on its changing role as a peace management organization

- Instead of dissolving the UNC, the UNC needs to find a way to change its role as a management organization for the Peace Treaty.

○ In spite of the clear direction of the whole nation of the United States on denuclearization and the ROK-U.S. alliance, President Trump has the potential to make unexpected decisions, so overcoming the so-called “Trump risk” is one of the biggest challenges, including matters pertaining to defense-spending appropriations.

- The official diplomatic channel, as well as 1.5 and 2 tracks, should be fully operational; and public diplomacy, including congressional and commercial diplomacy, should also be exercised.

 

 


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