Signup for the
UPF
E-Newsletter




UPF Brochure 2011

(PDF) Preview
World Scripture II

Order Now
UPF Journal

Dialogue & Alliance
Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding. |
| E.S. Yang: Energy Requirements of North Korea: Cooperative Strategies for the Two Koreas |
|
|
| By Dr. Yang Euy-seok, Research Fellow, Center for Energy Research, Korea energy Economics Institute |
| Saturday, July 31, 2004 |
|
The world envisages a new paradigm in meeting energy requirements, because many countries around the world have experienced structural changes in the political and economic environment. Especially, with the advent of the Euro community, the world economy faces a new kind of regionalism, characterized by openness in national boundaries and densely inter-connected market expansion to a regional bloc. Recently, there have appeared various perspectives for energy cooperation between the two Koreas, in which South Korea is requested to take a pivotal role in improving and promoting energy supplying capacity of North Korea. As a matter of fact, it is well recognized in the two Koreas that the dire energy difficulties should be overcome most urgently for a smooth transition of the North Korean economy. Since energy supplying capacity is prone to determine the self-reliance of the economy most primarily, there is no reason for North Korea to hesitate revamping its energy supplying functions of the economy from every viewpoint: technical, administrative and even institutional. This is why North Korea is requesting external aids so as to re-build its basic energy infrastructure such as power plants and electric power grids. Furthermore, at this moment, South Korea is drawing a grand vision for an integrated energy supplying system for the future of the unified Korea. It is well known that one of the principal goals of South Korea’s sunshine policy was to prevent the collapse of North Korea, which has suffered from widespread famine and a deteriorating industrial capability. Under the new government, the main backbone energy policy to North Korea is said to be that the South should be supportive for the North to design and activate energy rehabilitation programs in a practical and financially solid manner. And also, South Korea’s policy direction for regional energy cooperation is expected to be indispensably combining energy cooperation activities between the two Koreas and other Northeast Asian countries. The energy system integrated locally and regionally is said to be a necessary condition for the sustainability and mutual benefit of the economies of Northeast Asia. Therefore, South Korea’s energy cooperation activities are recommended to induce participation of North Korea into energy projects in Northeast Asia. Big drops in crude-oil imports brought about further shortages in the availability of refined petroleum products in the DPRK. These decreases were attributed to, in part, external economic sanctions and partly from North Korea's inability to pay for oil imports with hard currency. The lack of fuels, in particular, in the industrial sector, seriously aggravated the stagnating economy since 1990. So the worsening energy shortage in the DPRK is believed to play a key role in causing a fundamental work-failure of the DPRK economy. When it comes to energy problems of the DPRK, it should be noted that there are several key issues. First of all, much of its energy-consuming infrastructure is out of date and in poor repair. The heating systems in residential and other buildings are based on outdated technology. On the other hand, demand for energy services in the DPRK is suppressed and latent. Because of the lack of fuel in many sectors of the DPRK economy, when and if supply constraints are removed, energy use is likely to surge. In another word, residents, industries, and other consumers of fuel are increasing their use of energy services toward desired levels, even though the DPRK is deficient in energy product markets. Given its lack of hard currency and the domestic economy’s poor conditions, North Korea faces limitations to either technology or capital required to improve energy efficiency and conservation, to rehabilitate its electricity transmission/distribution grid or to develop reliable power plants. On the other hand, North Korea’s crude oil import volume in 2000 was only 15% of its 1990 imports. Even though the situation was getting better in the last two years, the absolute import level in 2002 was only 0.6% of the level of crude oil imports of South Korea. The oil shortages look more serious on the basis of import volume per person. Furthermore, there was no rise at all in its refining capacity since capacity peaked at 70 thousand BPSD in 1975, largely due to suspension or reduction of oil supplies from its close socialist countries. First, South Korea has to lay a solid foundation for the integrated energy supply system in the Korean peninsula. This foundation will promote economic cooperation activities, since revitalizing the energy sector will have an enormous backward and forward effect on the rest of the economy of the two Koreas. In addition, energy cooperation activities will produce mutual trust between the two Koreas, which has been broken over the long division under different political and economic systems. To integrate the energy supply system is to practically improve the energy security of the two Koreas, which will yield mutual benefits for the two Koreas. It should also be noted that energy cooperation activities between the two Koreas will provide solutions to energy problems in South Korea. Most importantly, special energy projects will support the rehabilitation programs of North Korea’s energy sector, which urgently requires massive external assistance. As a matter of fact, to provide energy requirements from generating fuels to maintenance technology on site is to rehabilitate the economy in crisis most practically, since energy shortages have been the main cause of difficulties of the North Korean economy. Ultimately, cooperative provision of energy infrastructure requirements will lead to promotion in mutual exchanges between the two Koreas and reduction in political and military tensions. To build confidence between the two Koreas is a prerequisite in handling energy cooperation activities in the future. Oil and gas projects South Korea has accumulated abundant technology and management know-how for revamping refineries and petrochemical industries. Possible projects include providing maintenance facilities, participating in repair of existing refining facilities, joining in processing business of oil refinery products, and providing heavy fuel oil for power plants. Prospective cooperation activities also include development of oil-industry infrastructure such as construction of oil harbors, oil transporting pipelines and a state-of-art refinery complex. In addition, much emphasis should be put on cooperative activities in the crude oil logistics between two Koreas, since to share oil storage and transportation facilities would be greatly advantageous to all. Furthermore, oil companies of South Korea can invest in oil exploitation projects in North Korea with an advanced drilling technology and financial resources. Especially, LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) looks like a very promising energy source, The DPRK designated several districts as special economic zones in which foreign companies are permitted to operate in a market economy way. These districts include the Najin/Sonbong Free Trade Zone, the Sinuiju Administration Zone, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the Kumgangsan Special Sightseeing Area. The occupants in these special districts expect that a somewhat different energy supply system for cooking and heating will be established. For these districts, LPG fuel is believed to be the most preferable energy source. As one type of inter-Korea economic cooperation, LPG provision to the DPRK is expected to yield several benefits to two Koreas. In South Korea, the national trunk line of LNG was set up over the main provinces of the country. Therefore, natural gas is accessible to dwellers of any kinds of housing in the densely populated areas in South Korea. This fact implies that LPG industry is approaching to limits of market expansion. As a matter of fact, the LPG industry of South Korea is facing diminishing demand. If the LPG industry of South Korea gets into the DPRK market, the effects could be mutually beneficial to two Koreas, since the DPRK can take over the South Korea’ soundly accumulated technology in providing LPG to the consumers, while the LPG industry of South Korea meet an expanding market. LNG projects under planning can be represented by provision of natural gas to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Though embryonic, the projects include building-up of a LNG supplying base at Paju in Kyunggi Province and construction of a 44-km gas trunk line of 30 inch-diameter to Kaesong. From the viewpoint of energy cooperation in Northeast Asia, PNG projects look most promising, in case the trunk line will be originating from the Far East of Russia and pass though North Korea. The PNG project will not only provide South Korea with an opportunity to use abundant natural gas resources, but also give North Korea an opportunity to earn hard currency by levying on passing charges of facilities, even when out-flows of supplied gas to North Korea’s users from the line will not be allowed. Furthermore, since North Korea’s participation in the project would be guaranteed, there will be another big forwarding industrial chain-effect to the rest of the North Korea economy. Over the last several years, focus between the two Koreas was on the electricity supply from the ROK to the DPRK as a practical cooperation project. North Korea requested the South to provide 500 thousand kw at the Joint Ministerial Meeting in December 1999. South Korea tabled a proposal at the Committee of Economy Cooperation Promotion that the South can discuss concrete energy aid programs after taking fact-finding surveys on the real situation of electricity shortages in North Korea. The two Koreas had a discussion meeting on “fact-finding surveys and energy aid programs” but failed to reach any agreement. South Korea insisted firstly on a fact-finding survey for checking electricity situation and secondly discussion on cooperative aid programs. But North Korea argued that a joint fact-finding survey can be allowed only under the condition of electricity provision in a scale of 500 thousand kw. The energy projects related to electricity provision, however, are still most keenly attracting interest from various quarters. First of all, electricity supply project to the Kaesong Industrial Complex is already well matured with opening of the pilot business complex in June 2004. According to the basic plan, at the 1st stage, electricity provision will be carried out by expanding electric power grid lines of South Korea to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Electricity of 100 thousand kw will be provided by laying a transmission line of 24-km between Musan and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. At the second and third stage, the plan is under consideration to construct power plants on the site. On the other hand, the inter-connection of electricity power grids between the two Koreas has been the hottest issue after North Korea’s assistance requests for electricity of 2 million kw. One of the issues the two Koreas are facing is to overcome a technical hurdle, attributed to differences in technical specifications and in standard quality of electricity. It is required that a complete fact-finding survey should be carried out for scrutinizing the electricity supply system of North Korea and designing electricity provision options. The anticipated costs of electricity aid (500 thousand kw) are split into two parts. Firstly, the construction cost of a transmission power line is expected to amount to 146.6 billion won (US$ 12.22 million), and secondly, the generating costs will reach to 227.5 billion won (US$ 18.96 million) annually. And a prospective project would provide technical and financial assistance for upgrading power plant facilities of North Korea. Overall repair costs of power plants in North Korea are estimated to reach to 2,358.5 billion won (US$ 19.65 billion) in terms of the price basis of 2000. Because of the large scale of financial costs, it seems prudent to proceed on these projects gradually after evaluating their performances by taking pilot projects. Integration of the power grids of the two Koreas into the power grid trunk lines of Northeast Asia takes one big cooperative effort for which the various countries concerned have to prepare from a multinational view point. It should be kept in mind that the integrated power grid line of the Korean peninsula in embryo is expected to be inter-connected to the main trunk power grid lines of Northeast Asian countries, which will be built up in the future in order to transmit electricity generated in Eastern Siberia of Russia to China, South and North Korea, and Japan in the end. Anthracite coal is said to be the key to the pending energy crisis of North Korea, since its energy supply and demand depend greatly on its own coal reserves. On the other hand, South Korea needs to locate large-scale consumers of anthracite coal. Before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, anthracite coal had met more than 20 percent of the primary energy use of South Korea. After then, the share started to drop so rapidly that coal use in South Korea recorded only 1.9% of total energy supplies in 2002. It is a history of energy industry that during past two decades, South Korea has revamped its outdated energy industry and streamlined the troubled domestic anthracite-coal industry. To reconstruct the domestic coal mines, South Korean had to scale down its coal industry in a very stable and gradual manner even when Korea experienced plummeting anthracite coal use over the same time span. As a result, at this moment, massive reserves of anthracite coal are waiting for appropriate consumers, spreading out big financial costs to the economy. As of 2003, there were reportedly more than 10 million tons of anthracite coal reserves, of which 60 percent are reserved and managed by the central government. At a time in which North Korea faces so dire an energy crisis, it looks plausible and practical that the two Koreas map out energy cooperation projects utilizing these energy sources in most efficient ways. On the other hand, it is recommended that the South join in improving productivity by doing maintenance and repair work for North Korea’s obsolete coal mines. At the same time, the idle coal production equipment of the South can be utilized in the North. Provision of equipment for shaping coal briquettes is very urgent and a clean coal technology should also be included in cooperation aids. Furthermore, there are several prerequisites for cooperation activities between two Koreas. The first is to scrutinize and describe the real picture of the energy industry of North Korea before choosing appropriate cooperation options. Another important prerequisite is to obtain national consensus in South Korea before taking a deeper step to practical cooperation projects, since those projects will require South Korea to shoulder huge financial burdens. In addition, energy cooperation projects can produce enormous effects on all the sectors of the economy in a most fundamental way. Their effects will impact the economy and national security. Therefore, energy cooperation activities should be activated and coordinated comprehensively under the political circle’s thoughtful consideration. It also needs to secure international consensus for the necessity of cooperation activities from the international community, since as shown at the Six-Party Talks, so many countries have different interests in the ultimate destiny of North Korea. Phase I (the nuclear issue being resolved from the comprehensive view): Cooperation activities in first priority include exchanges in energy experts between two Koreas, provision of surplus fuels to North Korea, maintenance aid for the crippled power plants, building-up of energy cooperation framework, electricity provision to the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Kumgangsan special sight-seeing zone. Phase II (the phase in which the international community agrees on energy assistance to North Korea): Main activities are specified with maintenance of existing refineries, cooperation in oil-product processing, interconnecting electricity grids of the two Koreas, participation in developing energy resources of the North, participation in building up new power plants, and revamping the existing power industry. |
